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Comment
Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission: Designer Genes Don't Fit
Ann Sturtz Viksnins
Amgen, Inc. ("Amgen")' holds a United States patent to
certain genetically-altered cells2 that produce unusually large
amounts3 of a hormone called erythropoietin ("EPO").4 In a
complaint filed with the United States International Trade
Commission ("ITC"), 5 Amgen alleged that Chugai Pharmaceu-
1. Amgen, Inc. is a biotechnology company located in Thousand Oaks,
California. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737, 1738 (D. Mass. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
2. U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 ("the '008 patent"). Amgen was the first to
clone the gene for human erythropoietin, doing so in October, 1983. Amgen, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738. Inventor Dr. Fu-Kuen Lin obtained and cloned the
amino acid sequence for erythropoietin, and Amgen filed a patent application
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office on December 13, 1983. Id.
3. These genetically-altered cells do not have the natural feedback mech-
anisms found in human cells which allow genetically altered cells to produce
erythropoietin at much higher rates than normal human cells. In re Certain
Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906, 1908 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Conm'n 1989), ff'd, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4. EPO is a kidney-made hormone which controls the production of
erythrocytes, commonly known as red blood cells. ALEXANDER P. SPENCE &
EwUOTr B. MASON, HUMAN ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 468 (1979). A small
amount of the erythropoietin hormone circulates in the blood to maintain the
proper number of red blood cells so that cells receive enough oxygen. Id. at
469. If the number of red blood cells becomes too low, a person becomes ane-
mic and tires very easily because his or her organs are not receiving enough
oxygen. Id. EPO increases the rate of production of red blood cells, and thus
relieves the symptoms of fatigue in anemic patients. Id. Sales of erythropoie-
tin in the United States by pharmaceutical companies approached $200 million
in 1990, and the market for the drug in the United States alone may eventu-
ally reach the billions of dollars. Donna K. H. Walters, Two Proposed Laws
Bitterly Divide Biotech Industry, L.A. TIMEs, June 3, 1990, Business Section,
at 1.
5. The ITC, established under the Tariff Act of 1930, is a federal admin-
istrative agency which investigates and adjudicates complaints of unfair trade
practices. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988) (organization of the ITC); id. § 1331 (gen-
eral powers of the ITC); id. § 1332 (investigations by the ITC); id. § 1337 (in-
vestigation by ITC of unfair practices in import trade).
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tical Co. of Japan and its American subsidiary, Chugai Pharma
U.S.A., Inc. (collectively "Chugai") engaged in unfair trade
practices, in violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act,6 by im-
porting and selling recombinant erythropoietin ("rEPO") 7
made using genetically-altered cells covered by Amgen's pat-
ent.8 The ITC's Administrative Law Judge determined that
Chugai did not violate section 337 because Amgen's patent did
not cover the process for producing rEPO.9
In Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Com-
mission,10 the Federal Circuit'1 affirmed, concluding that 1988
Amendments to the Tariff Act did not prohibit the importation
of end-products made abroad using a patented intermediate
product.' 2 According to the Amgen court, Chugai did not vio-
late section 337 of the Tariff Act because neither the product
imported by Chugai (rEPO) nor the process by which it was
made (cloning) were patented.13
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
7. The chemical structure of naturally made and recombinantly made
EPO is functionally the same. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. The only difference is the method by which they
are made. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 103-04
(D. Mass. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Chugai licensed the rights to a patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,677,195 ("the '195 pat-
ent"), covering both a nonrecombinant method for purifying EPO and compo-
sitions of highly purified EPO. Id. at 96. Natural EPO is made by means of
the purification method taught by the '195 patent, and rEPO is made by means
of the recombinant method taught by Amgen's '008 patent, which requires the
use of Amgen's patented DNA sequences, vectors, and host cells. Id. at 97.
8. Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
9. Id. at 1910. Upon further review, a panel of the ITC dismissed
Amgen's complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 1911.
10. 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11. The Federal Circuit exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over pat-
ent and trademark decisions of the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (1988), the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, id.
§ 1295(a)(4)(A), the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, id § 1295
(a)(4)(B), and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, id. § 1295(a)(4)(B). The
Federal Circuit also has direct appellate jurisdiction over ITC rulings relating
to unfair trade practices involving § 337 of the Tariff Act. Id. § 1295(a)(6). See
generally Robert D. Wallick & Neil R. Ellis, The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit At the Leading Edge of High Technology Issues,
36 AM. U. L. REv. 801 (1987) (discussing the scope of the Federal Circuit's ju-
risdiction); Rochelle Cooper-Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit- A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (discussing the Federal Circuit's
patent jurisdiction).
12. 902 F.2d at 1540.
13. Id. Contrary to the determination of the ITC panel, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that the ITC had subject matter jurisdiction over Amgen's complaint.
Id. at 1536.
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The Amgen court's interpretation of the Tariff Act has
broad implications for the biotechnology industry.1 4 Most im-
14. Traditionally, commentators have defined biotechnology as the "will-
ful harnessing of life forms for human use." APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY:
ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (John R. Fowle M ed., 1987) [hereinaf-
ter APPLICATION]. Under this broad definition, people have utilized biotech-
nology for thousands of years through domestication of crops and animals, and
through the production of fermentation products like cheese, wine, and beer.
Id, at 3; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC TECHNOLOGY:
A NEW FRONTIER 47-56, 107-14 (1982) [hereinafter GENETIC TECHNOLOGY]
(describing modern fermentation technologies and the food processing indus-
try).
According to more current definitions, the term "biotechnology" means
"the commercialization of the tools of molecular biology, mainly [recombinant]
DNA and hybridoma or cell fusion technologies." APPLICATION, supra, at 3. It
includes a variety of technologies "linked only by their association with life or
life-processes." Thomas G. Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Application Ezam-
ination, in TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CHEMICAL PATENT PRACTICE 31,
36 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 286, 1989). See generally Linda S. Watrud, The Biological
Revolution: Tools and Products of Biotechnology, in APPLICATION, supra, at
11-29 (historical perspective on the development of modern molecular biology).
This Comment utilizes the more modern definition of biotechnology as the
commercialization of various aspects of molecular biology.
Modem biotechnology has great potential for creating new industrial
products and applications, for generating advances in medicine, and for im-
proving modern agriculture. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY 1-5 (1991) [hereinafter COMPET-
ITIVENESS]; Eric Christensen, Note, Genetic Ark- A Proposal to Preserve Ge-
netic Diversity for Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV. 279, 289 (1987); 136
CONG. REC. S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
For example, one researcher genetically engineered a strain of bacteria which
could assist in cleaning up oil spills by breaking crude oil down into its multi-
ple components. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); Valerie
M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of Biotech-
nology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 264-65 (1987) (describing potential for creat-
ing new products and processes but noting need for regulation of
biotechnology research and the release of genetically engineered organisms
into the environment); Christensen, supra, at 289-90 (examining the need for
regulation of the industry in order to maintain genetic diversity).
Biotechnology has fostered advances in the diagnosis and treatment of dis-
ease. See, e.g., G. J. V. NossAL, RESHAPING LIFE: KEY ISSUES IN GENETIC ENGI-
NEERING 54-58, 60-62 (1985) (explaining role of biotechnology in diagnosing
certain blood diseases and AIDS); id. at 43-45, 50-51 (discussing how biotech-
nology produces rare but important proteins in clotting factors for
hemophiliacs and insulin for diabetics).
Biotechnology also offers improvements in agriculture. For example,
scientists have developed a biological insecticide which is considered to be
safer than chemical treatment. George Gunset, Peoria Lab Readies Biological
Weapons Against Bugs, CmI. TRIB., May 25, 1990, at 1.
Because of the great potential of biotechnology, investment in the indus-
try is increasing. See Joan Hamilton, The Gene Jockeys Are Finally Seeing
Some Green, BuSINESS WEEK, July 2, 1990, at 77. "Presently, the biotechnol-
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portant biotechnological end-products cannot be patented be-
cause they can be found in nature, albeit in very small
quantities. 15 Further, the processes for making these bi-
otechnological end-products are sufficiently well known and
thus not patentable. 16 Biotechnology advancements receive
patent protection only for the intermediate products used in
the production of the end-products, such as the genetically al-
tered cells covered by Amgen's patent.17
Utilizing patented intermediate products in the United
States to make a particular end-product is actionable under a
general patent infringement statute, but the statute does not
provide damages for the importation of end-products made with
patented intermediate products.' 8 Moreover, because of the
Amgen court's narrow interpretation of the Tariff Act, a holder
of a United States patent cannot prevent foreign companies
from importing into the United States end-products made
abroad using patented intermediates.19 Thus, foreign biotech-
nology companies enjoy a significant competitive advantage
over domestic companies.20
This Comment argues that the Amgen court's literal inter-
pretation of section 337 of the Tariff Act reflects neither the
legislative intent of the 1988 Amendments nor sound public
policy.2' Part I of this Comment outlines principles of patent
ogy industry produces billions of dollars annually for our Nation's economy.
President Bush recognized the importance this field has on our economic
growth by designating biotechnology research as a funding priority in his pro-
posed budget." 136 CONG. REc. S3108 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini). For a further introduction to genetic engineering and the
biotechnology industry, see COMPETITIvENESS, supra, at 1-5; In re O'Farrell,
853 F.2d 894, 895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988); John M. Czarnetzky, Note, Altering Na-
ture's Blueprints for Projit. Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV.
1327, 1330-34 (1988).
15. Naturally occurring substances do not have the requisite "novelty" re-
quired under the patent laws and thus are not patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1988).
16. To obtain a patent, an inventor must prove that his or her invention is
not "obvious." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Biotechnology companies have difficulty
obtaining process patents because much of the manufacturing of the end-prod-
ucts is performed by bacterial or animal cells. The inventive part of biotech-
nology is genetically altering the cells so that they produce the desired end-
product. The method of genetically altering the cells, "cloning," is well known
and practiced in the field and therefore does not meet the requirement of non-
obviousness.
17. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
19. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 148.
21. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
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law and the Omnibus Trade and Tariff Act of 1988 as applied to
biotechnology. Part II addresses the Federal Circuit's reason-
ing and holding in Amgen. Part III analyzes the implications of
the Amgen holding for the biotechnology industry and proposes
various alternatives for mending the hole in the net of patent
protection available to biotechnology companies in the United
States. To combat the Amgen court's interpretation, this Com-
ment recommends statutory changes.
I. BASIC PATENT LAW AS APPLIED TO
BIOTECHNOLOGY
The Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents
to inventors in order to encourage and reward creativity and
new research.22 The patent gives the owner the "right to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States,"23 and, if the invention is a pro-
cess, the "right to exclude others from using or selling through-
out the United States, or importing into the United States,
products made by that process."' '
22. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (patent as an incentive to inventors to risk cost of time,
research, and development to develop new products and processes); Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (patent as a reward and "inducement to
bring forth new knowledge"); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refin-
ing Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (patent as a reward for invention and as en-
couragement for disclosure).
The major type of patent, the "utility" patent, has a lifespan of 17 years.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The notion of a time-limited patent strikes a careful
balance between the general American distaste for monopolies and a desire to
encourage innovation by excluding others from practicing one's invention.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 10-11. Society benefits from the public disclosure, as well
as from the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture, while
the inventor benefits from the limited exclusionary rights. Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 480-81.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
24. I& A patent grants the right to exclude others from practicing that
invention. The patent does not necessarily allow the patent holder to practice
his or her own invention. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02(1) (1991). If
the practice of one's own invention would require the infringment of another's
patent, then permission, generally in the form of a license, is required from
the other patent owner. ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT
§ 16.01 (1988).
1991]
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A. ACQUIRING PATENT RIGHTS
The U.S. patent laws define the scope of patent protection
to include "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. ' 25 There are three legal requirements for a patent:
novelty,26 utility,27 and non-obviousness.2 8 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") issues a patent to an inventor only
if all three requirements are met.2 9
Every patent application contains two distinct parts: the
"specification" and the "claims." The specification details how
the invention works and instructs how best to use the inven-
tion.30 The claims provide "the metes and bounds of the right
which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the protected invention."'31
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, § 101 al-
lows the patenting of "anything under the sun that is made by man[kdnd],"
provided it fulfills the statutory requirements. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
However, § 101 does not permit patenting of the laws of nature, physical
phenomena or abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-91 (1978)
(algorithm or mathematical formula not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (scientific truth, mathematical formula, abstract princi-
ples, or phenomena of nature not patentable); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo In-
oculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("patents cannot issue for the discovery of
the phenomena of nature"); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 116 (1854) (scientific
principle not patentable); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 174-75 (1852) (same).
Thus, Watson and Crick's discovery that DNA is the blueprint for life, Dar-
win's discovery of a new species of turtle, and Newton's discovery of the law of
gravity are not patentable, nor are pure mathematical formulas like 2+2=4,
or E=mc. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
27. Id. § 101.
28. Id § 103.
29. See id. § 101-03.
30. Id. § 112. The disclosure must teach how to best use the invention. In
re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 434-35 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
31. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). A patent contains one or more claims which define the
scope of the invention. The U.S. Patent Office permits only certain types of
patent claims: "product," "process," and "product-by-process." Product pat-
ent claims cover only the thing itself. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 978, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (pro-
tein necessary to clot blood is a product which may be patented); Application
of Larsen, 292 F.2d 531, 533 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (patent application for a certain
organic compound), cert denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962); see also Czarnetzky,
supra note 14, at 1355-61 (discussing patenting of animals as product patents).
Process patents, unlike product patents, cover only the method by which
the thing was made. See, e.g., Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645
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Although the specification is essential to understanding and
learning to use the invention, the claims actually determine the
legal scope of the patent.32
Although not a biotechnology case, In re Durden33 ad-
dresses whether the Patent and Trademark Office may issue a
patent for a process that would be considered obvious except
that "either or both the specific starting material employed and
the product obtained [were] novel and unobvious." Durden
had been granted patents for a chemical end-product and its
novel starting material, but the Patent Office rejected Durden's
process claims of making the end-products from the starting
materials.35 Relying on In re Albertson,36 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Patent Office's rejection. Albertson holds that a
process is not patentable simply because the starting material
and end-product are novel and nonobvious.37 Consequently, the
Federal Circuit rejected Durden's process claims as obvious be-
cause another inventor had already described the process in a
patent, even though Durden used a different starting material
and created a different end-product.38 Thus, In re Durden
stands for the proposition that the existence of a patentable
starting material or end-product does not make an obvious pro-
cess non-obvious.
F.2d 976, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (applicant claimed a process patent for the manu-
facturing of multicellular plastic film).
Product-by-process claims are another form of product claims. Product-
by-process claims cover only the product made, not the process by which it is
made. In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1966). "A product may be
defined by the process of making it if the English language is inadequate to
describe the invention." Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,
666 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (product-by-process patent for a blood
clotting factor).
32. McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir.) ("In order
to determine what is patented, the threshold requirement is to examine the
language of the claims at issue."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Genentech,
Inc. v. Welcome Found., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1367 (D. Del. 1990).
33. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
34. Id. at 1408.
35. Id at 1407.
36. 332 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
37. Id at 382.
38. Durden, 763 F.2d at 1409. The Durden court addressed only the issue
of whether process claims can be patented. The court did not face the issue of
whether to prohibit the importation of end-products made using Durden's pat-
ented starting materials-the issue which later arose in Amgen.
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B. PROTECTING PATENT RIGHTS
1. Action for Infringement
Once an inventor acquires a patent, she may preclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention.39 The pri-
mary mechanism for protecting these rights is an action for in-
fringement.40 Section 271 of title 35 protects patent owners by
prohibiting others from making, using or selling products that
infringe on their patented invention.41 This statute covers all
products patented in the United States, whether made in the
United States or abroad. 42 Where the product is manufactured
is irrelevant. Once the product is in the United States, it is sub-
39. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988) (authorizing action for infringement of patent).
If an entity prevails in its patent infringement suit, it may recover treble dam-
ages, id, § 284, and attorney's fees, id. § 285. See also Great Northern Corp. v.
Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 167 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (treble damages); Kori
Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 656-57 (Fed. Cir.)(double damages), cert denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beck-
man Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1547-48 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (treble damages
and attorneys' fees); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717
F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (treble damages).
41. Section 271 of title 35 provides:
(a) [W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States during the term of the patent there-
for, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the in-
vention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted
for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
In addition to literal infringement, a person or corporation may be liable
for infringement according to the doctrine of equivalents. Under the doctrine
of equivalents, the court may find infringement if the device "perform[s] sub-
stantially the same overall work to achieve substantially the same overall re-
sult by substantially the same means." Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 608 (1949)).
There are some limits to the doctrine of equivalents, such as "prosecution
history estoppel." Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558,
1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1434 (1991). If the Patent Office
requires a patent owner to limit a claim during the patent application process,
the patent owner cannot later argue that the claim is broader in order to es-
tablish an infringement claim. Id.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
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ject to the United States patent laws.43
Further, section 271(g) of title 35 protects process patent
owners by establishing liability for importers of products made
using a process patent." Although section 271 cannot prohibit
foreign entities from making products or using processes in
their own countries that are patented in the United States, it
does subject them to potential infringement liability once their
products enter the United States. 45 A significant gap in the
protection offered by section 271(g) is that it does not address
whether a person or corporation is liable for infringement if
the end-product imported into the United States was manufac-
tured using a patented intermediate product.
2. The Tariff Act of 1930 as Amended in 1988
Other than infringement actions brought pursuant to sec-
tion 271, the Tariff Act of 1930 provides the principal means of
protection for American companies against unfair use of pat-
ented products or processes by foreign entities. 46 Section 337 of
the Tariff Act allows the International Trade Commission to is-
sue exclusionary orders that prevent products that infringe on
United States patents from entering the United States.47 Ex-
43. See id. § 271(a).
44. Section 271(g) of title 35 provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or
uses within the United States a product which is made by a process
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the im-
portation, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such
process patent.
Id. § 271(g).
45. See idt § 271.
46. The purpose of the Tariff Act of 1930 (and its predecessor, the Tariff
Act of 1922) was "to provide an adequate remedy for domestic industries
against unfair methods of competition and unfair acts instigated by foreign
concerns operating beyond the in personam jurisdiction of domestic courts."
Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1988). Section 337(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, authorizes the ITC to issue exclusionary orders as a remedy for U.S.
patent owners against unfair methods of competition by foreign corporations.
Sealed Air Corp., 645 F.2d at 985. The United States Customs Service may
block the importation of products that would clearly infringe on a valid Amer-
ican patent. Exclusionary orders pursuant to § 337(d) are an example of the
ITC exercising powers delegated to it by Congress pursuant to the power of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; In re
Chain Door Locks, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 272 (U.S. Int'l Trade Conm'n
1976).
In contrast, patent infringement proceedings "are on a party by party ba-
sis, involving private rights, and are not part of the international trade laws of
the United States." The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United
1991]
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clusionary orders are the most effective means of protecting
American patent rights, especially for small businesses that
cannot afford cumbersome and costly infringement litigation.48
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
("Omnibus Act") 49 significantly amended the Tariff Act of
1930. Congress intended for the amendments to open foreign
markets to United States goods, improve the competitiveness of
American firms, and reform the area of intellectual property.50
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 122 F.R.D. 281, 315 (1988)
(statement of David Foster, former assistant general counsel of the ITC, and
international trade counsel for the Senate Finance Committee). Unfair trade
practices proceedings, however, permit a person to seek an exclusionary order,
an extraordinary remedy not otherwise available under federal law. I. at 315-
16.
48. United States patent law has no extraterritorial effect. Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972). Therefore, exclusionary
orders to ban the importation of products are one of only two alternatives for
U.S. patentees to exclude others from using their products or processes. The
other possible way to protect a product or process is to obtain a patent in a
foreign country and litigate abroad in the event of unauthorized use. See Jud-
son Vickers, Note, Congress Attacks Process Patent Piracy-But Who Walks
the Plank?, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 615, 616-17 (1988). This latter option of
obtaining foreign patent protection can be expensive and laborious. Id at 617.
Further, not all countries have patent protection laws, or their laws may not
be as stringent as those in the United States. Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, The GATT Uruguay Round-- Its Significance for U.S. Bilateral Trade
with Korea and Taiwan, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 312 (1990). Some observers
suggest that certain countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and
Taiwan, have purposely weak patent protection or refuse to enforce their pat-
ent laws in order to capitalize on foreign knowledge and thereby develop their
own countries economically. Calvin Sims, Wounded by Patent Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1987, at D1. Finally, some countries permit companies to make
insignificant changes in the patented product and consider it no longer infring-
ing under local patent laws. Industry Representatives Urge Change in Compet-
itiveness Policy at ITC Hearing, 41 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 273, 273
(1991). For example, in Japan, major patents originally worth $200 million to
$300 million in sales have been pending eight years or more; the patents may
not be worth much when they finally issue because Japan permits companies
to make slight changes in the product without violating Japanese patent law.
Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 516-17 (1988).
50. "We need this legislation to stop the piracy of American intellectual
property," Senator Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) declared, noting that such
losses to American business were estimated at $40 billion per year in a recent
ITC study. 134 CONG. REC. S10713 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988). Further, Senator
DeConcini, a principal author of the Senate bill, stated that one of the princi-
ples behind the 1988 Omnibus Act was that "no one should be allowed to im-
port a product manufactured off-shore that would constitute patent
infringement if it was manufactured in the U.S." News release from Sen.
DeConcini (Mar. 22, 1990) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
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With regard to the latter, Congress recognized that the Tariff
Act needed "a more effective remedy for the protection of
United States intellectual property rights."51
The 1988 Amendments strengthened one of the Act's prin-
cipal protections of American industry: section 337(a).5 2 This
section prohibits the importation of goods that infringe on a
valid United States product patent or that were made by means
of a valid United States process patent. As amended, the sec-
tion prohibits the importation into the United States, the sale
for importation, or the sale within the United States after im-
portation of articles that (i) infringe on a valid and enforceable
United States patent or (ii) are made, or made by means of, a
process covered by a valid and enforceable United States
patent.53
The 1988 amendments to section 337 eliminated the re-
quirement that the party claiming an unlawful trade practice
by a foreign competitor show that the domestic industry af-
fected by the importation was being operated economically and
efficiently prior to the importation of the particular product.54
Elimination of this requirement makes it easier for domestic
entities to obtain exclusionary orders.
51. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1341(b), 102 Stat. at 1212. The amendments
to § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, according to its sponsor, Senator Lautenberg,
"remove hurdles that stand in the way of an innovator's ability to get protec-
tion from the [ITC]." 134 CoNG. REC. S4906-07 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988).
52. Section 337 of the Tariff Act is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988). The 1988 amendments repealed the former
version of § 337(a) of the Tariff Act. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342(c), 102 Stat. at
1215-16. The earlier statute had provided:
The importation hereafter for use, sale, or exchange of a product
made, produced, processed, or mined under or by means of a process
covered; by the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters
patent, whether issued heretofore or hereafter, shall have the same
status for the purposes of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19
U.S.C. § 1337] as the importation of any product or article covered by
the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent.
Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 515, 54 Stat. 724 (repealed 1988).
54. The former § 337(a) provided that the importation of infringing arti-
cles would be considered an unfair method of competition only if the peti-
tioner established that the importation would "destroy or substantially injure
an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the United States."
Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337(a), 46 Stat. 590, 703 (1930) (prior to 1988
amendments). The 1988 Amendment eliminated this requirement; it was
designed to enable "independent inventor[s] and small businesses, particularly
in the emerging biotechnology industry, to produce their product and seek re-
lief under § 337 [19 U.S.C. § 1337]." 134 CONG. REC. S10713 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1988).
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C. PROTECTING BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT RIGHTS
Congress was concerned about the biotechnology industry
when it debated the Omnibus Act. It recognized that product
and process patents had become increasingly important to the
biotechnology industry,55 that the biotechnology industry was
particularly susceptible to patent infringement,56 and that
greater process patent protection was needed.57 It further rec-
ognized that stronger patent laws could greatly help the Ameri-
can biotechnology industry56 and bring United States patent
protection laws in line with those of Japan and almost all of the
Western European countries.5 9 Indeed, the Conference Com-
mittee addressed a problem closely analogous to the one liti-
gated in the Amgen case, stating in its report: "It should be
noted that many of the 'products' produced by patented
processes are themselves 'used' in the manufacture of another
product which is introduced into commerce. '60
55. See supra note 31 (introducing product and process patents generally).
Examples of biotechnology product patents include a strain of genetically engi-
neered bacteria which breaks down crude oil, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 305 (1980), and a genetically engineered mouse useful in studying dif-
ferent cancer treatments, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866.
Examples of biotechnology process patents include a method of DNA
cloning in bacteria, U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224, and a method of DNA cloning in
animal cells, U.S. Patent No. 4,339,216.
56. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 516-17 (1988).
57. See 134 CONG. REC. S4859-62 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of
Senator DeConcini).
58. For example, Senator DeConcini has stated the following:
American scientists invented genetic engineering and America is cur-
rently the world leader in biotechnology research. However, because
of the rapid advancements in this promising field, our patent and
trade laws have failed to keep pace. Instead of providing incentives
and the path to progress, the Patent Code and trade laws have be-
come impediments to the commercialization of biotechnology re-
search. We cannot sit idly by watching another American industry
succumb to foreign competitors.
136 CONG. REC. S3107-08 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
59. 134 CONG. REC. S4859-62 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
60. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 516-17 (1988). The Con-
ference Committee's discussion of the lack of patent protection for end-prod-
ucts relying on patented intermediates included the following:.
Consider a process patent held on a method for preparing a plasmid
or other vector. The use of the plasmid or vector to insert a new gene
into a living cell, instructing the cell to produce an important human
protein (such as insulin or interferon) which will then be separated
from the fermentation mash, purified, and packaged into single dos-
age forms, is a commercial use and is ineligible for the limited protec-
tion granted to non-commercial uses. The field of biotechnology is
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The Committee did not take the next step, however, and
direct that patented intermediate products also receive protec-
tion under the Tariff Act. Either inadvertently, or because of
an unstated objection to protecting intermediate products, Con-
gress left a gap in the net of the patent protection laws. That
gap was the subject of Amgen's appeal to the Federal Circuit.
II. AMGEN, INC. V. U.S. INTERNTATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
Amgen owned the '008 patent,61 a product patent62 cover-
ing certain DNA sequences, 63 vectors6 and host cells65 used to
particularly susceptible to commercial "users" without sales. For ex-
ample, a patent may cover a process for producing a microorganism
using recombinant DNA technology. The microorganism is then used
to produce a particular commercial end-product of great value. The
bill's provisions limiting remedies against users are not intended to
apply to such commercial uses.
id. (emphasis added).
61. See supra note 2 (discussing Amgen's patent).
62. See supra note 31 (describing product, process, and product-by-process
patents).
63. Inside every living cell is at least one chromosome. The chromosome
is the basic hereditary material of all organisms. WILIuAM T. KEETON, BIoLOG-
IcAL SCIENCE 99 (3d ed. 1980). Bacteria have only one chromosome, id. at 120;
humans have 46, SPENCE & MASON, supra note 4, at 63. The genetic informa-
tion in the chromosome is made of deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly known as
DNA. LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 559 (2d ed. 1981). DNA molecules are
divided into individual regions called "genes" which regulate activity in the
cell. KARL DRLICA, UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING: A GUIDE FOR
THE CURIOUS 4 (1984). Genes are the blueprints for proteins used by cells. Id
The genes encode the exact chemical structure for the proteins. Id. This ge-
netic code is very simple and made up of only four "letters": A, C, G, and T,
corresponding to four different chemicals. STRYER, supra, at 560. A DNA se-
quence is a combination of these letters in a particular order directing the cell
to make a specific protein. Id. at 565. In Amgen, the DNA sequence told the
cell to make rEPO. Amgen, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532,
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
64. Vectors are pieces of DNA found in a cell that are not a part of the
cell's chromosome, and are not essential to the maintenance of the cell.
STAYER, supra note 63, at 755-56. One of the most common vectors used by
scientists are "plasmids." BENJAMIN LEwiN, GENES 301 (1983). Vectors are
very useful because scientists can manipulate this DNA without harming the
cell's normal processes. STAYER, supra note 63, at 755-56. For example, scien-
tists can cut an insulin gene out of a human chromosome, paste it into the vec-
tor, and place the vector into a bacterial cell. Id. at 766; Ann M. Sturtz, Fine
Structure Restriction Endonuclease Mapping of Molecularly Cloned Cottontail
Rabbit Papillomavirus DNA from Rabbit Tumors 10-12, 19-20 (June 1986) (un-
published M.S. thesis, University of Minnesota, on file in the University of
Minnesota Medical School Library). The bacteria can then make all of its own
proteins needed to live and make human insulin. See STRYER, supra note 63,
at 765-66.
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make rEPO.66 The '008 patent does not cover EPO or rEPO, 67
nor the process of making rEPO,68 because EPO is a naturally
occurring product 69 and because the cloning process used to
make rEPO fails to satisfy the non-obviousness requirement of
the patent laws.70 The '008 patent grants Amgen the right to
exclude all others from using these DNA sequences, vectors,
and host cells as the "machinery" to produce the commercially
important rEPO in the United States.71 Chugai imported rEPO
into the United States. It made rEPO using host cells that the
'008 patent covered.72 Chugai did not actually import the host
cells covered by Amgen's '008 patent, but merely used them in
Japan in the process of making its rEPO. 73
65. Host cells are the recipients of the vectors. DRLICA, supra note 63, at
7-8. After introducing the vector into the host cell, scientists grow the cell
containing the vector in a rich broth until the single original host cell has
grown and divided many millions of times. Id at 8. Since all the cells in the
broth started from a single "parent" host cell, all the cells in the broth will be
identical. See id They will all contain the same vector and will all produce
the same proteins. This culture of identical cells is what is called a "clone."
IM
66. See supra note 7 (describing rEPO).
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (suggesting why Amgen can-
not own the product claims to rEPO, a naturally occurring protein).
68. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing process patents
generally). Amgen originally included the process claim for making rEPO via
recombinant DNA methods in its patent application, but the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examiner would not allow this claim to issue.
Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534 n.1. According to the PTO examiner, this claim was
merely the application of a known (i.e., "obvious" and thus not meeting the
patentability requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103) process to new starting materials
to produce a new product, and thus not patentable. Id
69. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing naturally oc-
curring substances and the novelty requirement for a patent).
70. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting the non-obviousness
requirement of a patent).
71. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1533-34. A civil action for infringement is a rem-
edy available to a patent owner. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text
(discussing remedies for patent infringement).
72. In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906,
1908 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The
ITC determined that Chugai made its imported rEPO by the host cell method
rather than by utilizing a completely different nonrecombinant purification
method licensed from another company, Genetics Institute, Incorporated. Id
73. Because Chugai's activities occur outside the jurisdiction of the United
States patent protection laws, its manufacturing process cannot constitute pat-
ent infringement. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531
(1972). United States patent laws have no extraterritorial effect. Id "To the
degree that the inventor needs protection in markets other than those of this
country .... [he must] seek it abroad through patents secured in countries
where his goods are being used." Id.; see also Certain Recombinant Erythro-
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Amgen filed a complaint with the ITC,74 principally, alleg-
ing7 5 that this importation of rEPO made using its host cells
poietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908; supra note 48 (discussing jurisdiction of
federal courts under the U.S. patent laws).
74. The ITC has authority to hear only unfair trade practices claims; it
does not have jurisdiction over infringement claims. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(1988) ("The Commission shall determine... whether or not there is a viola-
tion of this section [unfair practices in import trade]."); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988)
("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his pat-
ent."); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) (granting district courts original and exclusive
jurisdiction over civil actions arising under any Act of Congress relating to pat-
ents, such as 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988)). Amgen did initiate a concurrent civil ac-
tion for infringement in federal district court. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1337-38 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. Chugai also challenged on appeal whether the ITC had subject matter
jurisdiction over Amgen's complaint, and whether the Federal Circuit had ap-
pellate jurisdiction over the Commission's dismissal of the complaint. Amgen,
Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The ITC's
Administrative Law Judge held that the ITC had jurisdiction over the com-
plaint, id. at 1534-35, but the full Commission disagreed and dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 1535. Amgen appealed the Com-
mission's dismissal to the Federal Circuit. Id.
The Federal Circuit held that the Commission had subject matter jurisdic-
tion over Amgen's complaint. Id at 1536. According to the Federal Circuit,
whether the ITC has subject matter jurisdiction depends on the test estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). In Bell, the
Court examined whether the complaint on its face sought relief that the tribu-
nal was empowered to grant. 327 U.S. at 682. If the tribunal had statutory au-
thorization to order such relief, then it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the claim. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1536 (citing Bell).
The Federal Circuit applied the Bell analysis and determined that the
Commission had jurisdiction over the complaint because on its face it alleged
an unfair trade practice and because Congress had authorized the ITC to hear
such allegations and to grant appropriate relief. The court found irrelevant,
for jurisdictional purposes, that Amgen could not ultimately prevail on the
merits because the alleged complaint was not frivolous and was not brought
merely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in a particular forum. Id. at
1536-37.
The Federal Circuit also discussed whether it had appellate jurisdiction
over the Commission's dismissal of the complaint on the stated grounds of a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1535. The Federal Circuit's authority
to review the Commission's decisions arises out of § 1337(c) of title 19 of the
U.S. Code, which states: "Any person adversely affected by a final determina-
tion of the Commission... may appeal such determination... to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988)
(emphasis added). The issue in this regard was whether a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction which never reached the merits was a "final deter-
mination." Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535.
The Federal Circuit held that it did have appellate jurisdiction, reasoning
that § 1337(c) provided judicial review of "both positive and negative determi-
nations" by the Commission. Id, Otherwise, the Commission could "effec-
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was an unfair trade practice violating the Tariff Act.7 6 The ITC
dismissed the case and Amgen appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Because the Tariff Act prohibits the entry of either pat-
ented end-products or products made by using a patented pro-
cess, and not end-products manufactured using a patented
product,77 Amgen needed to convince the court that its host
cells were a type of process that made rEPO. Amgen argued
that its host cell7 8 claims were different from traditional pro-
cess claims. It proposed that the claims "were unique 'hybrid'
claims covering both product (cells) and intracellular processes
(thousands of chemical processes that take place within a living
cell). ' 79 According to Amgen, the host cell is not only a pat-
ented product, but also inherently a type of process because it
produces a desired end-product.8 0 Amgen further argued that
Congress's intent in passing the Omnibus Act was to broaden
the protection of the Tariff Act to prohibit the importation of
end-products made using a patented intermediate product.8 '
Thus, Amgen argued that the host cells should receive protec-
tion under the section of the Tariff Act8 2 that covers process
claims.8 3
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC's dismissal because
none of Amgen's claims in the '008 patent covered the process
Chugai used to make rEPO in Japan.84 The court rejected
Amgen's argument that the host cell claims were anything but
regular product claims.s5 It stated: "A host cell claim does not
'cover' intracellular processes any more or less than a claim to a
tively shield all negative determinations from judicial review simply by
labelling the determination as a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction." Id.
76. Amgen alleged Chugai violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988). Id.
Amgen filed its complaint with the ITC in January, 1988, prior to the passage
of the Omnibus Act. However, because the Omnibus Act expressly stated that
it applied to all pending actions, the court held that the statute with the Omni-
bus Act amendments governed the action. 902 F.2d at 1534.
77. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (describing coverage of
the Tariff Act).
78. See supra note 65 (describing host cells).
79. In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1906, 1908
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
80. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537-38; see also supra note 65 (describing host
cells and how they produce the desired end-product).
81. 902 F.2d at 1539.
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
83. 902 F.2d at 1537.
84. Id at 1540; see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text (discussing
the scope of Amgen's patent).
85. 902 F.2d at 1537.
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machine 'covers' the process performed by that machine. 86
Thus, Amgen could not claim any process patent protection.
Furthermore, the court held that Amgen could not claim
product patent protection because the Tariff Act did not extend
such protection to intermediate products used in foreign coun-
tries.8 7 The Tariff Act could protect Amgen's product patent
claims only if it were to prohibit the importation of articles
made abroad by a process utilizing a product covered by a
United States patent.88 However, the Tariff Act contains no
such language.8 9
In arriving at this conclusion, the court first looked to the
plain meaning of the statutory language of section 337 of the
Tariff Act.90 It read the statutory language and concluded that
the statute's reference to "a process covered by the claims of a
... patent"91 meant that the section covered only traditional
process claims and not products used in a process.92
The court then examined the legislative history of the
amended Tariff Act.9 3 The court reasoned that Congress could
have changed the statute to include products used in a process,
but instead enacted legislation covering only regular process
patents.9 4 The court concluded that Congress did not intend to
expand the Tariff Act's protection of processes to cover inter-
mediate products because it did not alter this key language of
the Tariff Act in the 1988 amendment.95
The court also reasoned that there was no indication that
"former section [337(a)] was intended to prohibit the importa-
tion of goods made by a process which merely used abroad a
86. Id at 1538 (footnote omitted).
87. Id at 1540; see also supra note 73 (applying Deepsouth's holding to
Chugai's activities in Japan).
88. 902 F.2d at 1538.
89. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Tariff
Act as amended in 1988).
90. As in all questions of statutory construction, we look first to the
plain meaning of the statutory language, and then to other extrinsic
aids such as legislative history, rules of statutory construction, and the
construction placed on the statute by the agency which administers it,,
the ultimate objective being to discern, if possible, the 'intent of
Congress.
902 F.2d at 1538 (citing Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
92. 902 F.2d at 1538.
93. Id. at 1538-40.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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product, apparatus, or material patented in this country. '96
The court assumed that Congress was not aware of the problem
its amendments created.9 7 Therefore, the court concluded,
Congress could not have intended the Tariff Act to forbid im-
portation of products made using a patented intermediate prod-
uct.98 The court recognized that present statutes did not
protect certain biotechnological patent claims, but concluded
that remedying the problem was a task for Congress to
address.99
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION
A. AMGEN'S FAILURE TO CLOSE THE GAP IN THE TARiFF ACT
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 337 does not
reflect the congressional purpose behind the Tariff Act's 1988
amendments,1 0 0 or sound public policy concerning the importa-
tion of goods into the United States. The Federal Circuit's in-
terpretation undermines one of the major purposes of the
Omnibus Trade Act: to increase the competitiveness of United
States industry.0 1 Congress found that section 337 of the Tariff
Act did not adequately protect United States patent owners
from having their patented products used by foreign companies
without permission.10 2 Congress explicitly stated that the pur-
pose of the amendments to section 337 was to "make [the Act] a
more effective remedy for the protection of United States intel-
lectual property rights.' 10 3
The Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 337 leaves a
conspicuous gap in patent protection. Congress wanted to close
96. Id at 1539.
97. Id at 1540.
98. 1&
99. The court stated: "[lit is a task for Congress, which can explore its im-
pact and side effects, and not for this court." Id
100. Congress amended the Patent Code and § 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act in
1988 to prevent offshore process patent infringement. 136 CONG. REc. S3107
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990). As the Act's sponsor noted two years after passage:
"In that important piece of legislation, Congress adopted the principle that no
one should be allowed to import a product manufactured offshore that would
constitute patent infringement if it had been manufactured in the United
States." Id (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
101. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 516-17 (1988).
102. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1341(a)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1212 (1988).
103. Id. § 1341(b), 102 Stat. at 1212.
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that gap.10 4 Amgen allows foreign companies to import and sell
certain products that would infringe a United States patent if
made in the United States. 0 5 Rather than narrowing the terms
of the statute, the court should have interpreted the statute's
reference to processes "covered by the claims of a... patent"'0 6
to include all patent protection provided in domestic operation.
This interpretation would be more consistent with the purpose
and spirit of the Omnibus Act.
Not only is the Amgen result contrary to the purpose of
the Omnibus Act of 1988, it also fails to reflect sound public
policy. Biotechnology suffers an inherent disadvantage in trade
protection; imany of its commercial products can never be pat-
ented as products'0 7 because they are necessarily identical to
naturally occurring substances. 0 8 These commercially useful
end-products cannot be protected directly. They may be pro-
tected indirectly, however, by patent protection for intermedi-
ate products. 0 9 The Federal Circuit's reading of the Tariff
Act" 0 failed to take into account the unique nature of the bio-
technology industry and congressional recognition that biotech-
nology has tremendous potential that should be encouraged."'
Patent rights constitute one of the foundations for the
profitable development of innovations."-2 Current uncertainties
in patent rights for biotechnological innovations, however, con-
tinue to hamper the industry." 3 The Amgen court treated bio-
technology as if it were a generic field, subject to patent law
rules developed for other scientific and technical fields. Bio-
technology is unlike most other fields; its end-products cannot
be patented." 4 The continued application of Durden and
104. "[IThe language of the bill as interpreted did not mirror our intent."
136 CONG. REC. S3107 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini
introducing Senate Bill 2326).
105. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (describing action for
infringement).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
107. See supra note 31 (discussing product patents generally).
108. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (asserting that naturally oc-
curring substances cannot be patented).
109. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing the patenting
of intermediate products).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87 (describing the holding of
Amgen).
111. See supra note 14 (discussing the utility and diverse applications of the
biotechnology industry).
112. COMPETITIvENEss, supra note 14, at 16-17.
113. Id at 18.
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Amgen in the biotechnology area could deny protection to inno-
vations that can be protected only through process patents." 5
If Congress overturned Durden and Amgen, patenting these
processes would permit the patent holders to block the impor-
tation of products produced by the use of patented intermediate
materials. 116
B. CONGRESSIONALLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
PROBLEMS LINGERING AFTER AMGEW
The troublesome result in Amgen has not escaped legisla-
tive attention. Congress has considered three possible amend-
ments which address the Tariff Act's lack of protection for
intermediate products.
Congress first considered an amendment that would ex-
pand the definition of non-obviousness 1 7 to allow the patenting
of a process that uses a patented product.118  In effect, this
would permit a "process-by-product" patent." 9 Under the pro-
posal, an applicant for a patent on a particular product may in-
clude in her claim a process which necessarily uses that
product. As long as the product is new, the process using the
product will be considered non-obvious and patentable along
with the product.
Second, Congress considered expanding the definition of
115. CoMPmrvENms, supra note 14, at 18.
116. I&
117. See supra note 28 (acknowledging the 35 U.S.C. § 103 non-obviousness
patentability requirement).
118. In particular, Congress considered the following amendment to allow
for the patenting of these types of processes:
When a process of making or using a machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter is sought to be patented in the same application as
such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, such process
shall not be considered as obvious under this section if such machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter is novel under section 102 and
nonobvious under this section. If the patentability of such process de-
pends upon such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
then a single patent shall issue on the application.
S. 654, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also 137 CONG. REC. E946 (daily ed. Mar.
14, 1991) (Biotechnology Patent Protection Act introduced in the House by
Rep. Richard Boucher).
The Bill, introduced in the 102d Congress, varied in text from that intro-
duced in the 101st Congress, but not in purpose: "A process of making a prod-
uct shall not be considered obvious under this section if an essential material
used in the process is novel under [35 U.S.C.] section 102 and otherwise nonob-
vious under [35 U.S.C.] section 103." S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1990).
119. In In re Durden, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office rejected Dur-
den's "process-by-product" claim. 763 F.2d 1406, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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infringing activity. A proposed amendment to section 271 of
the patent laws creates liability for anyone who:
without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses
within the United States a product which is made by using an essen-
tial biotechnological material (as defined under section 154(b)) which
is patented in the United States... if the importation, sale, or use of
the product occurs during the term of such patent12m
Third, Congress considered amending the Tariff Act to pro-
hibit the importation of end-products using patented intermedi-
ate products. 21  This proposal excludes from American
markets end-products manufactured from patented intermedi-
ate products, just as current law prohibits the importation of
products manufactured by means of patented processes and
products122 The proposal singles out biotechnological materials
for protection12S
120. S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b)(1) (1990).
121. See H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 139 CONG. REc. E207 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); 136 CONG. REC. E2909 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Boucher); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 136 CONG. REC. S3107 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
122. See H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 139 CONG. REC. E207 (daily
ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); 136 CONG. REC. E2909 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Boucher); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 136 CONG. REc. S3107 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
123. Both Houses of Congress considered bills that would prohibit the im-
portation of articles that "are made, produced, or processed under, or by
means of, the use of an essential biotechnological material [as defined under
section 154(b) of title 35 of the U.S. Code] covered by a valid and enforceable
United States Patent." H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced Feb.
7, 1990); see also H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced Sept. 18,
1990); S. 2326, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced Mar. 22, 1990).
Discussion in the House of Representatives identified the hole in the pat-
ent statutes:
I was an original author of the process patent amendments of the 1988
trade bill. Those amendments were designed to prevent the importa-
tion of foreign products into the United States when the manufacture
of such products within the United States would violate our patent
laws. But in light of developing technology, those amendments have
not proved fully adequate. So this new bill, which is clearly within
the spirit of the 1988 amendments, allows us to finish some unfinished
business.
136 CONG. REC. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); see
also 136 CONG. REC. E213 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher)
("Technological advancement has outpaced the government's ability to pass
laws which provide sufficient proprietary protection for biotechnology
inventions.").
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C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE AMGEN PROBLEM
This Comment contends that even though the three con-
gressional proposals offer some protection for intermediate
product patents held by the biotechnology industry, each has
negative ramifications.
1. Amend 35 U.S.C. Section 103 to Expand the Definition of
Non-obviousness
The proposed amendment to section 103 of title 35 ex-
panding the definition of non-obviousness would overturn the
corresponding holdings in Durden and Amgen.124 These cases
held that the use of a novel starting material in combination
with a known process was not eligible for a process patent.us
Congress's remedy would permit intermediate product patent
owners to gain process patent protection. The proposed amend-
ment has the advantage of granting the ITC the authority to is-
sue exclusionary orders 26 protecting intermediate patent
owners without actually amending the Tariff Act.'
The Tariff Act already prohibits the importation of prod-
ucts that infringe upon a United States patent or products made
using a patented process. 28 If end-products made using inter-
mediate products were covered by the original product patent,
the existing terms of the Tariff Act would prohibit their impor-
tation because their use in a process would present a valid pro-
cess patent claim.
With this definitional change, however, Congress would
take a much larger step than is necessary. The proposal would
transform well-known, "obvious" processes under current pat-
ent standards into "non-obvious" processes simply to overturn
Durden and Amgen. This proposal defeats the primary purpose
124. See supra notes 33-38, 84-89 and accompanying text (giving the hold-
ings of Durden and Amgen).
125. See supra notes 33-38, 84-89 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 47 (discussing ITC exclusionary orders).
127. This allows Congress to circumvent a concern about linking patent re-
form with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") negotiations.
See infra note 144 (discussing GATT). The House of Representatives and the
Bush Administration favored this option. See H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); 136 CONG. REC. E2909 (Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher) (re-
ferring to a letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce
on July 5, 1990, to the House of Representatives setting forth the Administra-
tion's views); Legislation: House Panel Examines Biotech Patent Legislation,
40 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 999, at 463 (Sept. 27, 1990).
128. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Tariff
Act).
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of a non-obviousness standard. The granting of patents is
designed to encourage innovation, 2 9 not to award those who
can somehow lay a proprietary claim to a product or process al-
ready known in the scientific or technical community.
130
Legislative tinkering with the definition of non-obviousness
for one particular industry threatens the basic structure of the
patent laws. The entire patent law scheme depends upon con-
sistent, objective determinations of non-obviousness based on
the expertise of the United States Patent Office.13' A decision
to alter definitional requirements not only would undermine
confidence in the objectivity of the patent system, but also
would discourage experimentation and innovation in areas
other than the narrow areas covered by the congressionally al-
tered definition of non-obviousness. 132 Inventors would be
more inclined to work in areas where there was a possibility of
acquiring a patent than in non-patentable areas. 33 If an inven-
tor is unsure whether she will be able to patent her technology,
she may prefer to keep it secret or not go through the expen-
sive and time-consuming process of pursing a patent applica-
tion. This defeats the constitutional goal of encouraging the
useful arts through patents.'3 Predictability, fairness and in-
centives for innovation would suffer.
2. Amend 35 U.S.C. Section 271 to Expand the Definition of
Infringing Activity
The proposal to expand the definition of infringing activity
to include products made using a patented biological material
recognizes the serious patent difficulties in the biotechnology
industry.13 5 Congress, however, should not focus exclusively on
129. See supra note 22 (discussing patents as a reward for ingenuity).
130. "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free ac-
cess to materials already available." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966).
131. I- at 18-19.
132. See id. at 10 (discussing Congress' reluctance to change the statutory
requirements for patentability).
133. See id at 9 (noting that Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State and
thus in charge of the U.S. patent system, believed that "[o]nly inventions and
discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, jus-
tified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly").
134. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
grant of patent rights).
135. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing the biotech-
nology industry's unique patent concerns).
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biotechnology. 136 Problems for intermediate products may
arise in other industries as well. For example, one of the cases
that Congress would overturn with this broader amendment is
In re Durden, a case concerned with a chemical-not a bi-
otechnological-patent claim.137 A congressional amendment
limited to biotechnology would not remedy the chemical situa-
tion in Durden. Moreover, amending the definition of infringe-
ment in a particular industry seems to invite further
definitional changes for other industries. One consequence of
such changes would be a patchwork definition of infringement
that would vary from one industry to another.
Further, merely bolstering the infringement statute does
not adequately protect many patent holders. The infringement
statute and the Tariff Act serve two different purposes. The in-
fringement statute allows a patent owner to recover damages
for economic harm suffered because of the infringing activity
once the infringing product is imported into the United
States. 38 The Tariff Act provides a mechanism to prevent the
importation of such products in the first place.139 If intermedi-
ate patent owners can prohibit the entry of infringing end-prod-
ucts into the United States, they do not need to rely on costly,
lengthy infringement actions to vindicate their intellectual
property rights.140 The recovery of damages in an infringement
action provides some relief to patent holders but is not, and
should not be, the primary method of policing unfair trade
practices.' 4 '
136. See 136 CONG. REC. E2909 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Boucher) (referring to a letter from the General Counsel of the Department of
Commerce on July 5, 1990, to the House of Representatives criticizing this pro-
posal as industry-specific).
137. 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the Durden case, see
supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. The Durden court would not permit
the patenting of chemical process claims even though the original starting
materials and the end-products were new. Durden, 763 F.2d at 1411.
138. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing infringement
claims).
139. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing Tariff Act
claims).
140. Congress placed a stringent one-year time requirement on all ITC ac-
tions. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1988); see also text accompanying note 48 (noting
the cost of patent infringement litigation).
141. If Congress does decide to amend the infringement statute, a better
modification than the current congressional proposal would extend infringe-
ment liability to persons or entities that import, sell or use within the United
States a product made from an essential material (such as an intermediate
product) which is already patented in the United States. Merely eliminating
the term "biotechnological" from the currently proposed congressional amend-
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3. Amend the Tariff Act to Prohibit the Importation of End-
Products Made by Using Patented Intermediates
The proposed amendment to the Tariff Act is the best of
the three proposals, although it should be redrafted.
a. Prohibit The Importation of End-products
Congress should amend the Tariff Act to prohibit the im-
portation of end-products made by using patented in-
termediates. Foreign enterprises should not have a competitive
advantage over American enterprises.
Congress should ban the importation of all articles made;
produced; or processed under, or by means of, all patented in-
termediates-not just patented biotechnological intermediates.
Congress simply cannot predict future innovations that may de-
velop in all industries. It should not require all industries to
suffer the same serious injuries as the biotechnology industry
before it acts.
The ban would extend protection to end-products using
patented intermediates in a manner that is not industry specific
and that can accommodate problems not yet identified. Con-
gress could thus address the general problem in a single law
that protects new technologies from their inception, rather
than leaving new technologies unprotected during their critical
inception period.' 42
ment would accomplish this result. Deleting the reference to biotechnological
material would better serve the needs of domestic patent protection laws.
Although Amgen concerned a biotechnological patent, other industries may
also suffer in the international economy because the only patent protection
available to them are intermediate product patents. By amending the statu-
tory definition of infringing activity without specific reference to the biotech-
nology industry, Congress would avoid having to amend the Act every time a
new industry, or an emerging portion of an existing industry, needed patent
protection for something more than its intermediate-product patents.
142. Congress should amend § 337(a)(1)(B) of the Tariff Act to include the
following as an unlawful activity:
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation,
or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner,
importer, or consignee, of articles that... (iii) are made, produced, or
processed under, or by means of, the use of an essential material, as
defined by section 154 of title 35, United States Code, covered by a
valid and enforceable United States patent.
This additional language would prohibit the importation of materials made us-
ing a patented intermediate product. The current statute only prohibits the
importation of patented end-products materials or materials that are made us-
ing a patented process. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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b. Ramifications for International Trade
International political repercussions need to be examined
whenever changes to the Tariff Act are proposed. The Bush
Administration is concerned about changing the Tariff Act 143
because the trading nations of the world are involved in a
round of negotiations concerning the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 14 Participants in this round of
negotiations145 are considering including patents and other
forms of intellectual property within the GATT.1 46 The private
143. See H.R. 5664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 136 CONG. REC. E2909-10
(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boucher) (referring to a letter
from the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce on July 5, 1990, to
the House of Representatives setting forth the Administration's views). The
Administration is concerned that an amendment to § 337 would create dissent
by GATr-participating nations. See id. at E2909.
144. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 ("GATT"). One hundred seven contracting parties are currently
participating in the GATT talks. Karen Tumulty, Nothing Short of a Miracle
Needed at Trade Talks, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at D6.
145. This round of talks, the "Uruguay Round" of GATT, began in Septem-
ber, 1986 and is the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations of GATT.
Bello & Holmer, supra note 48, at 309-10. The Uruguay Round of GATT nego-
tiations broke off in December, 1990 in Brussels when the 12-nation European
Community ("EC") rejected a demand by the United States and other agricul-
tural-exporting countries that it significantly lower its farm subsidies.
Tumulty, supra note 144, at D6. The talks resumed in February, 1991 when
the EC stated that it was willing to at least discuss cutting farm subsidies. Id
146. Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intel-
lectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285,
285-86 (1989). Representative Kastenmeier is the Chair of the Subcommittee
on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice for the
House Committee on the Judiciary. The negotiating goals of the round are the
following
In order to reduce the distortations [sic] and impediments to interna-
tional trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure
that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotia-
tions shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropri-
ate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in the
GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other comple-
mentary initiatives that may be taken in the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters.
Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Sept. 1986, at 7-8, reprinted in A. Jane Bradley, Intellec-
tual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay
Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 95 (1987).
The United States's goal for the Uruguay Round "is to achieve clearer,
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sector in the United States, Europe, and Japan supports the ef-
fort to include intellectual property protection in the GATT.J47
Because the purpose of GATT is to place all foreign and
domestic corporations on an even playing field,148 changes to
the Tariff Act should not impair the GATT negotiations.
GATT prohibits nations from giving their domestic corpora-
more enforceable rules [protecting] intellectual property." Bello & Holner,
supra note 48, at 313; Kastenmeier & Beier, supra, at 290-91.
147. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 146, at 287. The United States in
particular is concerned about protecting its intellectual property rights as the
percentage of American exports with a high intellectual property content
(such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, books, movies, and computers) has in-
creased to more than 25% of all United States exports. Intellectual Property,
Domestic Productivity, and Trade: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts, Intellectual Property and Administration of Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989). As of
March, 1988, the royalties received by American industries from the licensing
of intellectual property exceeded eight billion dollars per year, more than six
times the amount paid to foreign firms. 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BusNEss 54-59 (1988) (Table 10). Between $43 billion
and $61 billion is lost each year by the United States because of inadequate
protection of intellectual property rights around the world. U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE COMMIssION, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY R Grs AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE H3 (1988). "The
United States is losing the competitive edge gained from the research, develop-
ment, innovation, and creativity that flourish when investment in creative de-
velopment is rewarded with exclusive rights that enable the establishment of a
foothold in foreign markets." Bello & Holmer, supra note 48, at 312.
148. Article 3 of GATT addresses the application of internal taxes and reg-
ulations, guaranteeing that foreign goods will be given equal treatment with
domestic products:
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of na-
tional origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements af-
fecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution, or use.
GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, part H, art. II, 61 Stat. A3, A18, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 202.
Foreign goods are now receiving better treatment than domestic products
in the United States. American corporations may not use Amgen's host cells
without Amgen's permission because of the United States product patent cov-
ering the host cells. Foreign corporations, however, may use them under cur-
rent law because the host cells are not themselves imported into the United
States. Only the products made by the host cells are imported.
GATT permits the regulation of imports which harm a domestic industry.
If a product is imported into a country which abides by the GATT regulations,
and that importation causes or threatens injury to the domestic corporations
producing that product, the country may take steps to remedy the situation.
GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, part II, art. XIX, § (1)(a), 61 Stat. A3, A58-59. Thus, the
United States would not violate GATT by altering the Tariff Act to permit ex-
lusionary orders against products made by a process which would infringe a
U.S. patent if made in the same manner in the United States.
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tions an advantage over foreign corporations. However, the
changes to the Tariff Act would not give United States corpora-
tions a competitive advantage.149 Rather, the changes would
eliminate the advantage foreign corporations currently enjoy by
requiring that all corporations respect United States patent
rights.15 0
Even if the Tariff Act is not in full compliance with GATT,
Congress should pass the proposed amendment. The United
149. The purpose of the proposals is not to give American companies spe-
cial protection against foreign competition, but to allow them to compete on a
level playing field. 136 CONG. REC. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
150. U.S. patent holders should not be left worse off than inventors in
other countries. 136 CONG. REC. E2910 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Boucher).
In 1987 the EC filed a complaint with a GATT panel claiming that § 337 of
the Tariff Act is incompatible with GATT rules on non-discrimination and na-
tional treatment under Article 3 of GAT trade rules. See EC Endorses
Panel's Ruling That Section 337 Violates GAYT Non-Discrimination Rules, 37
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 961, at 302 (Dec. 28, 1989).
The EC alleged that § 337 of the Tariff Act discriminated against foreign
companies because it gave the ITC jurisdiction over imported, but not domes-
tic, products. See European Community Files Complaint Alleging Section 337
Violates GATT, 33 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 526, 526 (1987).
The GATT council adopted a finding in early 1991 that § 337 is inconsistent
with GATT. See Lloyd Day et al., Bartering Away American Biotechnology:
The Coming Erosion of U.S. Patent Protection, in 137 CONG. REC. E1201-03
(daily ed. Apr. 11, 1991) (submitted by Rep. Levine). Such finding by the
GATT council does not necessarily sound the death knell for § 337. A number
of findings by the council have been left unimplemented, pending the outcome
of the Uruguay Round. GATT. Failure to Adopt Panel Reports an Agenda of
Council Session, But Little Action Taken, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. 662, 662 (1991).
Both the EC and Japan, parties which raised the complaint against the Tariff
Act in the GATT council, have also failed to implement findings. Peter
Montagnon, Fears Grow for GATT Disputes System, FINANCIAL TIMEs, April
25, 1991, at 13.
Although § 337 does give the ITC jurisdiction over foreign and not domes-
tic companies, this observation ignores an important issue. Foreign companies
whose only contact with the United States is the misappropriation of ideas
from American patents are not subject to the jurisdiction of United States
courts. "[Tihe lack of [U.S. District Court] jurisdiction over foreign manufac-
turers results in inadequate protection for many U.S. patentees .... [We need
to] make enforcement useful and available, fair to everyone." The Sixth An-
nual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 122 F.R.D. 281, 315 (1989) (statement by Don Banner, former U.S.
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks). Thus, even if a domestic corpora-
tion obtained an injunction against a foreign corporation, it could not enforce
the remedy in a foreign country, but it could enforce the injunction against an-
other domestic corporation.
Injunctive relief is available to a party only upon a showing of a threat of
irreparable injury for which it has no adequate legal remedy. 11 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942
(1973) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. Failure to abide by the injunction may
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States has, in the past, set its trade policy by considering issues
broader than the literal terms of GATT.15 ' The United States
has often engaged in trade agreements with other individual
countries, such as Israel and Canada, and a consortium of coun-
tries, such as other NATO member countries.15 2 Occasionally,
the United States has even acted unilaterally to restrain trade
when reform was needed.153 Thus, acting in a way not specifi-
cally sanctioned by GATT in order to protect domestic corpora-
tions from unfair foreign trade practices has ample
precedent.154
Patent protection is critical to the United States' trade
competitiveness. Congress should act even if GATT is violated.
The standards in several international intellectual property
conventions do not provide for adequate intellectual property
protection. What protections do exist are ineffectively
enforced.1s5
The intellectual property conventions are not universal.
Indeed, some countries do not have patent, copyright, -or trade-
mark laws at all. 56 Even in countries with intellectual prop-
result in a finding of contempt of court. Id. § 2960. Obviously a party over
which the court has no personal jurisdiction cannot be found in contempt.
Section 337 addresses this inconsistency by giving the United States Cus-
toms officials the power to prevent items from ever entering the United States
market. Just as an injunction grants enforcement powers to a sheriff, the
Tariff Act authorizes Customs officials to prevent infringing domestic goods
from unfairly entering the United States market.
The EC also complained that § 337 places foreign companies at a disadvan-
tage because they are required to defend themselves twice, once before the
ITC to prevent the issuance of an exclusionary order, and again in federal dis-
trict court on the grounds of infringement. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note
146, at 298. This argument ignores that a domestic company desiring a prelimi-
nary and permanent injunction would also have to litigate twice. FED. R. CIV.
P. 65. Domestic companies are able to obtain temporary preliminary relief;
however, they must still, if necessary, fully litigate the infringement suit on its
merits to obtain any permanent relief. 11 WRIGHT & MLLER, supra, § 2950.
151. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 48, at 307.
152. I&
153. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 5631, 52 FED. REG. 13,412 (1987).
154. Clyde Prestowitz, the principal advisor on Japanese affairs to the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce from 1983 to 1986, maintains that the faith placed in
GATT for ensuring the world's economic prosperity is misguided, and that
there are serious weaknesses in the current multilateral trading system. See
Clyde V. Prestowitz et al., The Last Gasp of GATTism, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1991, at 130; Clyde V. Prestowitz, Life After GAT. More Trade Is Better
Than Free Trade, TECH. REv., Apr. 1991, at 22.
155. See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645; In-
ternational Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Oct. 23,
1978, 33 U.S.T. 2703.
156. Bello & Holmer, supra note 48, at 312.
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erty laws, enforcement is often poor.'5 7 Injunctive relief, useful
in minimizing monetary losses, is often not available.' 5 Thus,
the ITC exclusionary order authorized by the Tariff Act re-
mains the most powerful mechanism by which American corpo-
rations can enforce their intellectual property rights.
The proposed amendment to the Tariff Act should not
have an adverse effect on the GATT negotiations. 15 9 Foreign
companies have taken advantage of the current law to acquire a
competitive advantage over American industries. These foreign
companies will oppose the proposed amendment, which is pre-
cisely why the amendment should be adopted. The Tariff Act
amendment would level the playing field by forcing foreign in-
dustries to abide by patent protection restrictions already ap-
plied to domestic industries. Congress could thus close the gap
in United States patent protection laws with a solution consis-
tent with the original purpose of the Tariff Act. 160 The Tariff
Act amendment would be in accord with GATT's purpose of
ensuring that both domestic and foreign corporations receive
equal treatment. 16 1
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in Amgen, Inc. v. United States Inter-
national Trade Commission interpreted the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, to prohibit the importation of patented end-products or
non-patented products made using a patented process, but not
the importation of non-patented products made using a pat-
ented intermediate product. This interpretation of the Tariff
Act leaves the emerging biotechnology industry largely unpro-
tected because most of its commercial end-products and
processes cannot be patented.
157. Id
158. Id at 313.
159. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the GATT
negotiations).
160. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of the Tariff Act).
161. While we do not believe that American biotech companies should
get special protection against foreign competition, we do believe that
our companies should be allowed to compete on a level playing field.
Foreign companies should not be able to evade U.S. patent laws for
products sold in the United States simply by moving production off-
shore. And our companies should receive the same process patent
protection that their competitors receive in Japan and Europe.
136 CONG. REC. E207 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
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Congress has responded with proposals to amend the Tariff
Act, modify patentability requirements, or change the patent
infringement statute. Intermediate product patents should re-
ceive the same protection from unfair foreign trade practices as
end-product and process patents. Congress intended in both
the Tariff Act and the amended Omnibus Act to amplify the
domestic patent protection laws. This Comment argues that
Congress should close this gap in the patent protection laws by
amending the Tariff Act to include process-by-product patent
claims, thereby allowing the United States to issue exclusionary
orders against foreign end-products that are created with inter-
mediate products patented in the United States.

